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Style in the Novel: 
Toward a Critical Poetics 
 
Daniel Hartley 
University of Leeds 
 
Abstract This article outlines a systematic theory of style that aims to combine “social formalism” 
with narratology. Beginning with a reading of a little-known essay by Raymond Williams on the 
history of English novelistic prose, the article argues that Williams’s insights into the social 
preconditions of modern style can be suggestively combined with Mikhail M. Bakhtin’s theory of 
the inherent multiplicity of novelistic discourse and Richard Walsh’s pragmatic theory of narrative 
“voice” to produce a core definition of style. Style is (1) a linguistic mode of social relation; (2) one 
of several subordinated, relatively autonomous linguistic operations or “substyles” (Walsh’s 
instance, idiom, interpellation); or more properly, (3) the total mode of configuration of these 
substyles. The article then proceeds to embed this definition within a broader critical poetics. It 
argues that stylistic production in the novel is literally “in-formed” by several factors, for example, 
the “linguistic situation” (the state of language as a writer would have experienced it, including its 
inner tensions and social stratifications), “stylistic ideology” (the self-conscious stylistic projects 
that writers develop), and the linguistic proprieties of inherited novelistic genres, types, and forms 
(which are themselves mediations of sociality). These categories are exemplified through an 
analysis of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927). 
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The history of the novel is inseparable from the rise of modern prose. If the true hero of 
Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis (2003 [1946]) is realism—a mode of representation of everyday 
life that is serious and tragic, that incorporates the dynamic and “problematic” nature of 
individuals and societies, and that is sensual and “creatural”—then its villain is the ancient 
separation of styles: the Stiltrennung. The Stiltrennung was a discursive regulation of what is 
sayable, by and to whom and how, immanent to rhetorical and poetic composition. Its 
distinction between high, middle, and low styles and the topics and speakers appropriate 
to each were broadly analogous to precapitalist social hierarchies: high style for the nobility, 
low style for the commoners. While the separation of styles was distinct from the 
separation of poetic genres, tragedy was always composed in the high style. By definition, 
then, the Stiltrennung was the enemy of a democratic, creatural realism capable of discerning 
the tragic seriousness of everyday life. Mimesis is the story of the gradual, faltering victory 
of this realism over the stylistic regulation of the Stiltrennung and of its uncertain future in 
the age of modernism and total war. 
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For Mikhail M. Bakhtin, too, novelistic discourse was inherently democratic. Unlike 
poetic discourse, which he saw as the artistic equivalent of the social forces of “verbal-
ideological centralization and unification” (Bakhtin 1981: 272), the novel was the artistic 
organization of social “heteroglossia,” a popular and conflictual cacophony of voices and 
sociolects. Bakhtin thus casts novelistic discourse as the populist hero fending off the stale 
homogenization and centralization of official (Stalinist) culture. Classical stylistics, 
however, was, according to Bakhtin, unable to account for this multiplicity of voices and 
styles. The unconscious propagandists of a hegemonic linguistic unity, scholars of stylistics 
only ever focused on one of several interrelated substyles (e.g., narratorial idiom at the 
expense of its internal relation to character dialogue), thereby systematically masking the 
single most significant feature of the novel. “Heterogeneous stylistic unities,” writes 
Bakhtin (ibid.: 262), “upon entering the novel, combine to form a structured artistic system, 
and are subordinated to the higher stylistic unity of the work as a whole, a unity that cannot 
be identified with any single one of the unities subordinated to it.” The novel is thus a 
tenuous balance between heteroglossia and artistic organization, centrifugal and centripetal 
forces. The uniqueness of style in the novel is that it is inherently relational, the result of the 
artistically organized interrelation of substyles. Bakhtin developed this relational theory of 
style more fully in his well-known notion of double-voiced discourse. 
Broadly speaking, then, the literary histories of Auerbach and Bakhtin are 
teleological, with a democratic multiplicity of styles gradually emerging from a hierarchized 
and monological stylization (though, of course, their accounts are never as simplistically 
linear as this generalization would suggest). Yet this productive mixture of literary critical 
analysis and political evaluation has until recently been alien to narratology. The latter 
originally was seen as a science of narrative with a universalizing intent. Its preference for 
structuralist and technicist objectivity led its practitioners to avoid overtly political 
pronouncements, all the while remaining bound to a strain of antihumanist thought that, 
in the context of the late 1960s, was nothing if not political (cf. Puckett 2016: 223–56). 
While Marxist critics, such as Fredric Jameson (1981) and Franco Moretti (1998), have 
occasionally drawn on classical narratology to articulate their theories of style and while 
certain narratologists, such as Susan Lanser (1992) and James Phelan (1996), have also 
periodically turned to social theories of the novel, no theory of style has yet been developed 
that unites “social formalism” with the conceptual rigor of narratology.1 The present article 
suggests one way this might be done. 
Beginning with a reading of a little-known essay by Raymond Williams on the 
history of English prose, the article argues that Williams’s insights into the social 
preconditions of modern style can be suggestively combined with both Bakhtin’s theory 
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of the inherent multiplicity of novelistic discourse and Richard Walsh’s pragmatic theory 
of narrative “voice” to produce a narratological and relational definition of style. The article 
then embeds this definition within a broader critical poetics which attempts to go beyond 
previous social-formalist theories of style. Using the stylistic innovations of Virginia Woolf 
as an example, it argues that stylistic production in the novel is literally “in-formed” by 
several factors, including the “linguistic situation” (the state of language as a writer would 
have experienced it, with its inner tensions and social stratifications), “experience” (the 
dialectical process through which shifts in transindividual and authorial subjectivity are 
fused with the collective rhythms of social life), and “stylistic ideology” (the self-conscious 
stylistic projects that writers develop). The overriding aim of the article is to fuse the 
political insights of social formalism with the technical precision of narratology. 
Williams’s Theory of Prose 
By 1969, over a decade before Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel” was first translated into 
English, Williams had reached a position which, while not identical to that of Bakhtin, has 
obvious elective affinities with the latter’s fundamental insight concerning the inherent 
relationality and multiplicity of novelistic discourse. Williams first set out his theory of 
English prose in the introduction to his edited anthology, volume 2 of The Pelican Book of 
English Prose: From 1780 to the Present Day (1969). His basic argument was that “good prose 
and style are not things but relationships; that questions of method, subject and quality 
cannot be separated from the changing relations of men [sic] which are evident elsewhere 
in changing institutions and in a changing language” (ibid.: 55). He sees style as a linguistic 
mode of social relation immanent to the more general relations of a given social formation, 
and he illustrates this point in a detour through the political prose of the Age of Revolution. 
Williams (ibid.: 27) notes that in the writing of such figures as Edmund Burke, Thomas 
Paine, and William Cobbett, “the kind of experience being drawn on and the version of 
other men [sic] indicated by a particular way of addressing them are not only substantial but 
are crucial to the precise nature of a political argument.” When Burke, for example, in one 
of his counterrevolutionary texts adopted the form of a letter addressed to “a very young 
gentleman at Paris,” he “[assumed] what he could not prove: a representative quality, 
describing the English constitution as if to a foreigner, and thus enlisting behind him the 
feelings of a united patriotism. . . . Burke relied on a pretended unity of national feeling to 
which in fact he was trying to persuade his English readers” (ibid.: 28). Williams’s 
immanentist understanding of style—here comprising tone and rhetorical construction—
thus involves the sublation of the traditional separation of style and content. On this logic, 
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style is a constitutive element of an expanded, social substance in which style, content, and 
purpose form a dialectical unity. 
Yet this is only the first sense in which style is relational. The second involves the 
interrelation of idioms and sociolects. Williams constructs an opposition between two main 
stylistic tendencies within modern political prose, which will become internalized in 
problematic ways in the discourse of the novel. I have named these tendencies (though he 
does not) “abstract universal style” and “particular style” (Hartley 2017: 80). The former is 
associated with the eighteenth-century philosophical essay, characterized by Williams 
(1969: 31) as the “climax of print”: “a uniformity of tone and address; an impersonality, 
assuming no immediate relation between writer and reader, but only possession, in a social 
way, of this language; a durability, as in the object itself, beyond any temporary impulse or 
occasion.” The “particular style,” on the other hand, is primarily oral in nature and is 
associated with the immediacy of personal experience: “direct address to an ever-widening 
public, having the strengths of contact, of the sounds of actual voices and experience . . . 
but in danger, always, of declining to opportunism—the devices of flattery . . . —and to 
simplification” (ibid.: 29). Superficially, of course, the abstract universal style appears to be 
the linguistic embodiment of reason, moderation, and good sense, but Williams’s point is 
that its social condition of possibility was the hegemony of the British ruling class within a 
profoundly unequal capitalist society. The particularistic tones of a radical like Cobbett may 
occasionally (and mistakenly) strike the velvet ear of the scholar as indecorous rants, yet 
they were coextensive with the drive for universal suffrage. What seems rationally to be the 
superior form of prose—the abstract universal style—“assumes the political forms of open 
and rational discourse which in fact it is trying to create” (ibid.). 
Turning to the development of novelistic discourse, Williams (ibid.: 30) identifies 
four representational functions, each of which causes English prose to develop in different 
and often contradictory ways: description, “sustained analysis,” narrative (“narrative 
continuity”), and speech (“spoken . . . rhythms and constructions”). There is a remarkable 
similarity between Williams’s distinction of prosaic functions and Bakhtin’s (1981: 262) list 
of “the basic types of compositional-stylistic unities into which the novelistic whole usually 
breaks down.”2 Yet it is the “elements of contradiction and tension” between sustained 
analysis and reported direct speech that especially interest Williams (1969: 30), for they 
constitute the novelistic internalization of the abstract universal and particular styles, 
respectively. Each of these substyles embodies “a community of language and sensibility” 
(ibid.); it is an affective-cognitive assemblage immanent to a specific set of social 
relationships. Drawing on a polemical passage in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, 
Williams (ibid.: 35) notes that it is “not only the material life of ‘good society,’ but . . . its 
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associated tones of moderation and irony, which are a ‘very expensive production.’” The 
style of sustained analysis is said to be based on a “small educated class” (ibid.) whose 
livelihood and modes of writing were ultimately premised upon the widespread 
exploitation and expropriation of the working class. In contrast, and in an argument that 
comes close to a reductive conflation of formal property and ideological intention, 
Williams (ibid.) holds that in realism reported direct speech attempted to express the 
“actual life of a hard-pressed, hard-driven, excluded majority.” Thus the formal struggles 
that writers such as the Brontës, Eliot, or Elizabeth Gaskell faced when attempting to 
harmonize the abstract prose of sustained analysis with the more viscerally immediate 
speech of the working class is interpreted as a stylistic internalization of the experience of 
a class-divided society. It was also an index of writers’ own class positions and of their 
variable degrees of alienation from the everyday life they were attempting to represent. 
Williams subsequently distinguishes between so-called settled and unsettled prose. 
The epitome of the latter for Williams (ibid.: 44) is in the novels of Thomas Hardy, who 
experienced the distinction between the educated style of sustained analysis and the 
customary style of direct speech as a struggle internal to his very being: 
Hardy as a writer was mainly concerned with the interaction between the two 
conditions—the educated and the customary: not just as the characteristics of social 
groups, but as ways of seeing and feeling, within a single mind. And then neither 
established language would serve, to express this tension and disturbance. . . . An 
educated style, as it had developed in a particular and exclusive group, was dumb in 
intensity and limited in humanity. A customary style, while carrying the voice of 
feeling, was still thwarted by ignorance and complacent in repetition and habit. 
Hardy veered between them, and the idiosyncrasy of his writing is related to this. 
Because of his ambiguous social position and biographical trajectory, Hardy was 
versed in both “communities of language and sensibility.” Though he drew on the abstract 
style of sustained analysis for observational and analytic exactitude, he could not 
sympathize with its ways of seeing and feeling. Yet the customary speech of the particular 
style, with which he felt quite literally at home, was incapable of the conceptual and 
argumentative rigor and scope that was necessary to his advanced novelistic art. On 
Williams’s reading, then, which is not my own (cf. Hartley 2016), Hardy was forced to try 
to negotiate between the two, leading to the stylistic unevenness for which he became 
renowned.3 Hardy’s prose was deeply “unsettled,” yet the bulk of Victorian prose was 
“remarkably settled and solid: an achieved, confident and still powerful manner” (Williams 
1969: 47). Writers like Anthony Trollope, Thomas Macaulay, and Walter Bagehot shared 
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so much with the imperial and socially supercilious ways of seeing and feeling intrinsic to 
the educated style that their prose bears none of the scars of Hardy’s. On the contrary, they 
came to be seen as exemplars of modern English style: “While the ways of seeing and 
dealing last, that is English, and the schoolboys can be set to learn it: the attitudes and the 
style in a single operation” (ibid.: 48). Settled prose was thus an extension of the habitus of 
the ruling class. By learning to imitate it, schoolboys learned to incorporate themselves into 
the sensorium of dominance. 
Williams demonstrates convincingly that style is ultimately a linguistic mode of 
social relation. Style names the verbal relation of writer to (expected or desired) reader. 
This relation is mediated by the social contradictions internal to a given language. Because 
language for Williams (1977: 29) (after Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) is “practical 
consciousness,” the raw linguistic materials on which writers go to work is not simply 
neutral but is haunted by the still-dormant intentions of the divided classes who once spoke 
it. Ultimately, style in the singular denotes the (potentially agonizing) total mode of 
configuration of socially inflected substyles. Indeed, Williams shows that in the history of 
the novel the difficult interrelation of substyles—especially that of sustained analysis and 
everyday speech—constitutes a literary internalization and formalization of the class 
relations of capitalist society. What Williams fails to emphasize, however, is the 
transformative effect of the act of literary composition on linguistic raw materials (what I 
call the “linguistic situation”), not to mention what Meir Sternberg (1982: 112) has called 
the “Proteus Principle”: “the many-to-many correspondences between linguistic form and 
representational function.” 
Where Williams emphasizes the social-formalist problem of relating narratorial 
idiom and analysis to everyday speech, Bakhtin tends to focus on double-voiced discourse. 
The latter is the third in a tripartite typology: (1) direct, unmediated discourse directed 
exclusively toward its referential object; (2) objectified discourse (discourse of a 
represented person); (3) discourse oriented toward someone else’s discourse (double-
voiced discourse), which can be “unidirectional,” “varidirectional” or “active” (Bakhtin 
1984: 199). In Bakhtin’s terms, Williams was concerned with the interrelation of direct and 
objectified discourses, which involves the coming together of clearly distinguishable 
sociolects. Bakhtin (ibid.: 182), however, was drawn to techniques such as parody—those 
dialogical phenomena that nonpragmatic linguistics cannot account for, since they concern 
intention and context, not purely linguistic characteristics: 
For what matters here is not the mere presence of specific language styles, social 
dialects, and so forth, a presence established by purely linguistic criteria; what 
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matters is the dialogic angle at which these styles and dialects are juxtaposed or 
counterposed in the work. Yet this dialogic angle is precisely what cannot be 
measured by purely linguistic criteria, because dialogic relationships, although 
belonging to the realm of the word, do not belong to the realm of its purely linguistic 
study. (Emphasis in original) 
The question now, however, is how the combined discoveries of Williams and Bakhtin 
might be fused with a narratological vocabulary to enhance a social-formalist analysis of 
style in the history of the novel. 
Rhetorical Narratology: The Bridge to a Critical Poetics 
Arguably the work of the rhetorical narratologist Richard Walsh best lends itself to such 
an endeavor. Walsh’s theory of voice allows for the internal relationality of style in the 
novel, and his pragmatic approach to narrative is well equipped to account for precisely 
those dialogic phenomena that Bakhtin (1984: 181–82) named the object of 
“metalinguistics.” Walsh’s emphasis on fictionality is also a useful antidote to a further 
shortcoming in Williams’s theory of style. Williams has a tendency to conflate the 
biographical author with the fictional narrator, part of his larger failure to account for 
fictionality as such.4 Walsh’s (2010: 35) rhetorical approach, however, begins from the 
position that narrative is “a real-world communicative gesture—which, in the case of 
fictional narrative, is offered as fictive rather than informative.” Thus not only does he set 
out from a rejection of the classical structuralist notion that narrative is a structure (for 
Walsh it is an act), but he places the problem of fictionality at the heart of his theorization 
of narrative voice. 
He does so because he identifies a key contradiction in classical narratology. Gérard 
Genette famously distinguished between narrative “persons” (heterodiegetic, 
homodiegetic) and “levels” (extradiegetic, intradiegetic). Yet as Walsh (ibid.: 41) rightly 
observes, “within the communicative model, the concept of level disallows ontological 
discontinuity, because it is understood as a chain of literally transmitted narratives; but the 
concept of person depends upon ontological discontinuity, because otherwise there can 
only be homodiegetic narration.” Because the communicative model treats narrative 
mediacy as literal, irrespective of whether or not the narrative is fictive, “each act of 
narration, and the diégèse to which it belongs, must be part of one continuous line of 
narrative transmission” (ibid.: 40).5 Yet the personal distinction between hetero- and 
homodiegetic narrators presupposes a break in this continuity. Thus level disallows 
ontological discontinuity, while person depends on it. This contradiction arises, argues 
Walsh, because the communicative model cannot account for fictionality as such. By 
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granting priority to the structural products of fictive representation rather than seeing it as 
an act, classical narratology was unable to account for what Walsh (ibid.: 41) calls “the real-
world regime of fictionality.” 
Walsh proposes to resolve this problem by turning to Plato’s ancient distinction 
between diegesis (the poet speaking in his or her own voice) and mimesis (the poet 
imitating the voice of a character). Such a model allows for the fictionality of a given real-
world act of communication and generates the “recursive possibility that a narration may 
represent another narration” (ibid.). It distinguishes, in other words, between the category 
of extradiegetic heterodiegetic (diegesis) and all the others (mimesis): 
A typology of narration based on Plato’s distinction, then, recognizes two 
hierarchical modes of fictive representation, which may be a matter of information 
(diegesis) or imitation (mimesis). In fictive diegesis the information is offered 
and/or interpreted under the real-world communicative regime of fictionality, in 
which an awareness of its fictive orientation is integral to its rhetoric. In mimesis 
the imitation is specifically of an act of narration, so accordingly the informative 
function of diegesis is performed at one remove. (Ibid.) 
What, then, is the relation between diegesis, mimesis, and style? Walsh brings this question 
to bear on the narratological problem of “voice.” He produces a suggestive combination 
of the Platonic diegesis-mimesis distinction and Bakhtin’s three types of discourse (direct, 
objectified, double voiced). He delineates three subdivisions of voice as instance, idiom, 
and interpellation. These subdivisions traverse the informative (diegesis) and imitative 
(mimesis) modes of fictional representation. 
Voice as instance, like Bakhtin’s direct discourse, is a representational act in which 
voice is not objectified6 and carries out the task of narration. Voice as idiom, like Bakhtin’s 
objectified discourse, refers to an object (rather than an act) of representation. It invites 
ethical evaluation of the character whose discourse it represents. For voice as idiom to be 
detectable it must constitute a substyle that is clearly distinguishable from the linguistic 
norm established by the dominant narratorial style or, in the case of a character-narrator, 
from the standard language of a given time and place (it being precisely the distance 
between the two that Williams argued became a social-formalist problem in the history of 
the English novel). In the case of a represented narrating instance, that is, a narrative told 
by a character, both senses of voice apply: “In Moby-Dick, Ishmael’s narration considered 
as idiom tells us about Ishmael; as instance it tells us about Ahab and the white whale” 
(ibid.: 50). In cases where the notional voice is not objectified, however, that is, in narrative 
diegesis, Walsh (ibid.) argues that “the discursive features commonly embraced by voice 
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are equally, and perhaps better understood as style: by style I mean discourse features 
understood in their relation to meaning . . . rather than as the expression of subjectivity.” 
Style, for Walsh, is the idiom of diegesis, the noncharacter narrator. It is effectively the 
author’s own voice under the regime of fictionality but in which “there is no inherent 
expression of authorial selfhood—no authentic self-presence” (ibid.). Finally, voice as 
interpellation—the third subdivision—has both a narrow and a general sense, each 
referring to the production of a subject position. In its narrow sense it refers to perceptual 
and cognitive focalization (the spatiotemporal, often character-aligned perspective through 
which the reader experiences the story and which is an implicit premise of the rhetorical 
focus of the representational act). In its general sense it is the overall ideological subject 
position implied by any discourse and to which the reader (either consciously or 
unconsciously) imaginatively aligns herself. Finally, techniques such as free indirect 
discourse are to be understood as “a synthetic product of distinct senses of voice” (ibid.: 
52). They combine, to varying degrees, voice as instance, idiom, and interpellation. 
Taken in its totality, Walsh’s rhetorical and pragmatic theory of voice provides a 
rigorous narratological vocabulary that intersects with the social-formalist theories of 
novelistic discourse in Williams and Bakhtin. It also enables a more precise narratological 
understanding of style, a term I prefer to voice and which I understand in a more expansive 
sense than Walsh.7 By synthesizing the approaches of Williams, Bakhtin, and Walsh, a 
succinct narratological definition of style can now be formulated. 
Style, as it pertains to the novel, has three interconnected meanings. 
1. It is a linguistic mode of social relation, mediated by historically variable 
regimes of fictionality, which operates on and through and is informed and 
internally limited by the available linguistic resources, the level of education 
of the writer, genre and form, the reigning literary conventions, and so on. 
2. It is one of several subordinated, relatively autonomous linguistic operations 
featured in a given fictional narrative. These can be roughly divided into the 
three stylistic functions (which traverse the two principal modes of fictive 
representation, diegesis, and mimesis): 
a. style as instance 
b. style as idiom 
c. style as (narrow) interpellation (focalization). 
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3. It is the total mode of configuration of these subordinate linguistic operations, 
unidentifiable with any one of them. Depending on whether analysis is text-
oriented or reader-oriented, this can be viewed as: 
a. style as lexical configuration 
b. style as (general) interpellation. 
The increasing generality of stages 1 to 3 can be seen as a gradual dialectical 
totalization of the definition. One’s sense of an author’s style begins at the level of the 
individual sentences, but to understand style in the novel, which is by definition an 
artistically organized social heteroglossia, one must take into account the interaction of 
linguistic substyles and the functions of instance, idiom, and interpellation. This apparent 
transition from a monological conception of style to a multiaccentual one is then finally 
sublated in the sense of a given author’s total configuration of substyles. In other words, 
when one speaks in commonsense parlance of an author’s “style” in the singular (e.g., 
“Deborah Levy’s style”), one is most likely referring to some prereflexive intuition of steps 
1 and 3. A theoretical understanding of the singularity of an author’s style, however, would 
see it as the totalization of individual sentences and substyles configured according to a 
discoverable logic. This logic is simultaneously social and formal. 
Toward a Critical Poetics 
At this point what began as a theory of style in the novel opens into a critical poetics. For 
in the classical Greek technical handbooks, the task of poetics was to describe or delineate 
that which was rational within the process and product of poie ̄sis (Greek for “making” or 
“producing”).8 In other words, its aim was to discover the informing logic of specific works 
with a view to describing and prescribing them. A contemporary poetics could be 
reconceived less as an attempt to proclaim new rules of composition than as a research 
program designed to discover the social-formalist logic of literary works. In the second half 
of this article I shall outline three concepts that could contribute to the critical repertoire 
of such a poetics.9 I shall begin with a rhetorico-narratological analysis of Woolf’s To the 
Lighthouse (2000 [1927]) then subsequently broaden the approach to embrace that of a 
critical poetics. Woolf’s work is an intriguing object for such a poetics. On the one hand, 
it develops a self-conscious stylistic project whose execution and justification entailed a 
profound reckoning with a range of personal and social experiences, ideologies, and literary 
forms. On the other hand, the sheer existential intensity of Woolf’s work points toward 
the potential outer limits of critical poetics as such. 
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To the Lighthouse was Woolf’s fifth novel, the second of the “more and more poetic” 
tendency that characterizes the major novels of her middle period (Woolf diary entry, 21 
June 21, 1924; cited in Goldman 2010: 49). Her style consists here for the most part of a 
carefully controlled syncopation between diegesis with internal focalization and free 
indirect discourse.10 By never entirely surrendering herself to the idiom of her characters 
and by incorporating only the most limited range of formal English sociolects (an index of 
the novel’s sociologically limited range of representation), Woolf is everywhere able to 
maintain control over the range and intensity of the style.11 Thus although generally tending 
to narrate via internal focalization, she constantly switches registers between unidirectional 
(largely sympathetic) and varidirectional (mildly parodic) free indirect discourse and a more 
lyrical, figurative, impressionistic prose. The result is a beautiful, sometimes bewildering 
admixture of psychological nuance and extreme sensitivity to the colors and textures of the 
external world. Indeed, it has been claimed that Woolf’s realism—contra the ideology of 
modernism that casts her as the arch antirealist—consists in an equal sensitivity to inner 
subjectivity and the external, empirical world: “Woolf’s sense of the political necessity to 
be true to the objective material world, as well as to the imaginative vision, dictates her 
preference for free indirect speech over interior monologue and stream of consciousness. 
The narrative may ‘look within’ but it never stays within. None of her novels is without a 
third-person perspective; none are centred wholly in a subjective self” (Morris 2012: 42). 
Note the way Pam Morris’s connection of style to politics already exceeds the parameters 
of narratology sensu stricto, entering the realm of what I call “stylistic ideology,” to which 
I shall return below. While Morris’s general argument is persuasive, however, the 
particulars are disputable. It is arguably not free indirect speech per se that ensures Woolf’s 
dual allegiance to material world and psychological vision but the idiomatic license Woolf 
allows herself within internal focalization and her rhythmically and carefully crafted shifts 
between focalizers. 
Yet the novel also contains passages where this attempt to navigate a course 
equidistant between subject and object becomes radicalized. This results, on the smallest 
scale, in such dramatically impersonal passages as those of which Auerbach (2003 [1946]: 
531) famously asked, “Who is speaking in this paragraph?” Not logically attributable to the 
voice or perspective of a character or narrator, such passages irrupt into the narrative fabric 
like sudden epiphanies: 
“It’s too short,” she said, “ever so much too short.” 
Never did anybody look so sad. Bitter and black, half-way down, in the 
darkness, in the shaft which ran from the sunlight to the depths, perhaps a tear 
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formed; a tear fell; the waters swayed this way and that, received it, and were at rest. 
Never did anybody look so sad. (Woolf 2000 [1927]: 33) 
Classical narratology struggles to account for such passages. By treating narrative as 
a literal communicative transmission, it is forced into a wild-goose chase for a covert 
narrator or an implied author (cf. Patron 2010). Where this proves hermeneutically 
untenable, it squares the circle with “unnatural narratology” (Alber and Heinze 2011). Yet 
Walsh’s rhetorical approach allows precisely for such passages. In them the author speaks 
in her own voice or writes in her own style under the regime of fictionality. In other words, 
To the Lighthouse is a real-world communication undertaken within the framework of a 
historically specific regime of fictionality (a regime that Woolf was instrumental in 
questioning and, in doing so, newly constituting) according to particular poetical-rhetorical 
intentions. The pertinent critical question is not who is speaking? but how does it work 
and what does it mean?12 Here we can turn to the expanded conceptual repertoire of a 
critical poetics. I hope it enables not only a more nuanced sense of the texture of Woolf’s 
style but also a way of delineating her larger literary vision and its ideological constellation. 
Following Paul Ricoeur (1984: 54), I understand literary production to consist of 
three stages: prefiguration (a “pre-understanding of the world of action, its meaningful 
structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character”), configuration (the process 
of emplotment and literary composition), and refiguration (the process of reading). The 
concepts I shall outline align with stages one and two of Ricoeur’s model:13 “linguistic 
situation” and “experience” (prefiguration) and “stylistic ideology” (configuration). When 
a writer sits downs at her desk, perhaps in a room of her own, she inhabits and confronts 
a language consisting of a multiplicity of socially determinate elements. If she is to write, 
she must determine these social determinations. I call this phenomenon the “linguistic 
situation.” It is a hypothetical reconstruction of the state of language as a writer or set of 
writers would have experienced it, including its inner tensions and social stratifications. 
Rather than an indifferent linguistic background, it denotes the objective linguistic field 
which informs and limits writing. It is a field of linguistic enticements and constraints. A 
given writer’s linguistic situation consists of several subsituations. These include the 
geopolitical status of the language in which she writes (e.g., English as an imperial 
language), the national context (e.g., Standard English versus dialect), the geosocial 
trajectory of the author, situations of immigration, and histories of (post)colonialism.14 
These multiple scales structure and intensify a writer’s linguistic situation. They generate 
the fundamental forces with, through, and against which she writes. Finally, these force 
fields are populated by a constantly shifting mass of words, tones, and phrases, each with 
its own ideological or semantic valence, marked by the residual intentions of those who 
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once spoke them. Together with the subsituations, these constitute the totality of the 
linguistic situation. 
What were the coordinates of Woolf’s linguistic situation? At the most general, 
geopolitical level, language was coming to predominate over the image as an instrument of 
class rule. Literacy rates were rising rapidly, newspapers were growing, radio spread the 
word of rulers across the vast expanses of the nation and the empire. In such a situation, 
language was intimately imbricated with power and the fabric of social mores. As a result, 
linguistic experimentation assumed the force of a taboo. It involved questioning the entire 
social and political fabric of the day. In this broad situation the “Bloomsbury fraction” 
(Williams 2010 [1980]) to which Woolf belonged insisted on a new critical frankness and 
candor, rejecting the rigid, repressive formalities of the Victorian era that were ingrained in 
the English language. As her husband Leonard Woolf remarked, “It was this feeling of 
greater intimacy and freedom, of the sweeping away of formalities and barriers, which I 
found so new and so exhilarating in 1911” (cited in ibid.: 153). Finally, there is Virginia 
Woolf’s (2008 [1937]: 87) well-documented sense of the English language’s insidious 
connection to patriarchal social structures and a rigid utilitarian philosophy, to which she 
counterposes her project of multiperspectival composition and the art of suggestion: 
“[Words] combine unconsciously together. . . . In reading we have to allow the sunken 
meanings to remain sunken, suggested, not stated; lapsing and flowing into each other like 
reeds on the bed of a river.” 
This river returns in the following element of literary prefiguration: “experience.” 
A potentially vague term (cf. Jay 2005), the latter is understood here as an ongoing, 
prearticulate process through which transindividual subjectivity is constituted and formed. 
Williams (1977: 133–34) developed the notion of “structure of feeling” to describe 
precisely those “social experiences in solution, as distinct from other social semantic 
formations which have been precipitated.”15 “Structure of feeling” conceptualizes the living 
present of a given society. It is that which can be felt in determinate ways but which has not 
yet been consciously thematized or articulated. Williams also connects structures of feeling 
to subtle generational changes in language, which would suggest that there exists an 
intrinsic relation between structures of feeling and the linguistic situation. Past structures 
of feeling can be reconstructed through the identification of certain recurring motifs, 
tensions, or topoi (a “structure of particular linkages, particular emphases and 
suppressions” [ibid.: 134]) whose very recurrence in a given historical period results from 
the structural constellation of the feeling. “Experience” can then be understood as the lived 
process through which constant micrological shifts in individual subjectivity dialectically 
interact with the collective rhythms of social life. It works its way into a writer’s style not 
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necessarily via self-conscious volition on the part of the author (though it may well become 
that, as it does with Woolf) but through a process Helen Vendler (1995: 4) has described 
as “a cloning of the kinesthetic perceptions of [the] poet.” The socioaffective rhythms of 
a writer’s daily life (to variable degrees) insinuate themselves into the very fibers of her 
style. 
In Woolf’s case one gets a sense of this phenomenon in the opening pages of A 
Room of One’s Own (1977 [1929]). Seated beside the river, Woolf is in the process of 
developing a thought, which she compares to a small fish—“it darted and sank, and flashed 
hither and thither” (ibid.: 9)—when, finding herself walking across a grass plot as if 
locomotion were necessary to its logical development, “instantly a man’s figure rose to 
intercept me” (ibid.: 10). It is the college beadle: only fellows and scholars, who are 
exclusively male, are allowed on the grass. By the time she reaches the gravel, the thought 
has disappeared. The allegorical structure of this carefully constructed anecdote exemplifies 
Woolf’s daily experience. At every juncture the sociospatial structures of early twentieth-
century England are designed to enable the fluent, logical development of men’s thoughts, 
whereas women’s thought processes are constantly interrupted and fragmented. If we 
assume a minimal relation between such social and phenomenological structures and the 
types of literary and philosophical forms they inculcate, it should come as no surprise that 
Woolf chose to craft this everyday fragmentation into a powerful multiperspectival, 
feminist narrative mode. 
I write craft because the “linguistic situation” and “experience” do not simply persist, 
unadulterated, into the literary work. There is no sociological reductionism at work here. 
On the contrary, it is one of the crucial points of a critical poetics that it recognizes literary 
composition as the proactive and productive shaping of this prefigurative linguistic and 
experiential material (poie ̄sis, after all, meant “producing”). The operation of poetic shaping 
is informed by specific, discoverable logics. It ranges from verbal to stylistic to formal and 
generic levels. At the verbal level, as Woolf well knew, words come charged with affective 
and cultural associations. The narrativization of these words is not the pristine invention 
of meanings but the particularization and artistic guidance of preexisting meanings. Words 
and phrases are stylized, their meanings, tones, and timbres put to work within the purview 
of the author’s organized artistic totality. Woolf, with her extreme sensitivity to the 
semantic and sociological nuance of specific words and tones, is an expert in the artistic 
exploitation of their hidden “suggestions.” Yet this verbal level of poetic shaping is 
subordinated to those larger stylistic projects that writers develop. 
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Such projects are self-reflexive variants of what I call “stylistic ideologies.” Stylistic 
ideologies are ideas about what style is and how one should write. They range from 
spontaneous to self-reflexive. Spontaneous stylistic ideologies tend to reproduce the 
codified and noncodified linguistic norms prevailing in a given linguistic situation, which 
are themselves integral to the dominant ideology of a social formation. In literary terms, 
they tend to result in writing that conforms to preexisting generic expectations, even where 
it introduces subtle stylistic refinements. Self-reflexive stylistic ideologies, however, tend 
toward an awareness of their positions in literary history such as they conceive it and are 
motivated by an explicitly political desire to overcome modes of writing which they 
associate with social and artistic conservatism, obsolescence, or outright degradation. The 
critical reconstruction of a stylistic ideology involves a combination of theoretical 
extrapolation from the literary style itself and an interpretation of the terms in which the 
writer justifies that style. The former involves “close reading,” whereas the latter requires 
an ideological analysis of authorial paratexts, essays, and manifestos. It is important to note 
that style and stylistic ideology do not always concur. Inherited styles possess a material 
resistance—an ingrained tone or implicit worldview—that can potentially obstruct a 
writer’s stylistic intentions. More importantly, there is no necessary homology between 
authorial ideology (the personal political views of an author (cf. Eagleton 1976: 58)), 
stylistic ideology, and style. It is quite possible for an author’s own political stance to be at 
odds with the implicit politics of either her stylistic ideology or her empirical stylistic 
practice. 
In Woolf’s case we have already seen that Walsh’s pragmatic approach provides a 
precise narratological vocabulary with which to extrapolate the idiomatic and rhetorical 
logic of her style. This can now be supplemented by an attention to the verbal texture of 
Woolf’s prose. The following is the climax of an extended passage of diegetic internal 
focalization (where voice is not objectified) and free indirect discourse from the perspective 
of Lily Briscoe, who is trying to understand her confused feelings toward William Bankes 
and Mr. Ramsay: 
All of this danced up and down, like a company of gnats, each separate but all 
marvellously controlled in an invisible elastic net—danced up and down in Lily’s 
mind, in and about the branches of the pear tree, where still hung in effigy the 
scrubbed kitchen table, symbol of her profound respect for Mr. Ramsay’s mind, 
until her thought which had spun quicker and quicker exploded of its own intensity; 
she felt released; a shot went off close at hand, and there came, flying from its 
fragments, frightened, effusive, tumultuous, a flock of starlings. (Woolf 2000 [1927]: 
30) 
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The passage is remarkable in many respects. The syntax is hypotactic, yet the brevity 
of the subclauses lends it the rushed, additive sensation of parataxis. The assonance of 
“danced” and “gnats,” the repetition of “danced up and down,” and the consonance of n 
and p sounds in the opening line lends the prose a compressed lyricality of expression. The 
sentences, chasing Lily’s thought, dash headlong toward the explosion which, in a touch 
of Woolfian genius, coincides with a gunshot in the “outside” world. Just as Lily’s thoughts, 
in the preceding passage, have become entwined with the bark and branches of the pear 
tree, so her epiphany is expressed in the “frightened, effusive, tumultuous” flock of 
starlings, as if her mind has scattered in a burst of oblivion across the seascape. By imbuing 
thought with the physical activity and sensory vitality usually attributed to plot, Woolf’s 
prose at its most extreme constitutes a threefold operation. It seeks the indifference of 
inside and outside, deconstructs the subject-object opposition, and strives to attain a purely 
impersonal realm in which multiperspectivity gives way to an absolute beyond all 
perspective. 
With this in mind, let us return to one of the key critical texts on which Woolf”s 
reputation as critic is based, her essay “Modern Fiction” (1919, 1925).As is well-known, 
Woolf rejects the dominant literary style she associates with H. G. Wells, Arnold Bennett, 
and John Galsworthy. She refers to these writers as “materialists” (Woolf 2008 [1937]: 7), 
by which she means that they focus on naturalist, physical, and corporal details at the 
expense of the “spirit” and that they “spend immense skill and industry making the trivial 
and the transitory appear the true and the enduring” (ibid.: 8). What is perhaps less 
remarked on is that the word Woolf uses to name her counterideal is “life” (ibid.) or “life 
itself” (ibid.: 10). Life is an ambiguous term precisely to the extent that it escapes any stark 
opposition between subject and object, inside or outside. Life, taken to its extreme, is 
entirely impersonal (cf. Esposito 2012: 137). The question then becomes what mode of 
representation would be adequate to absolute impersonality? Woolf is clear on what it 
would not be: “There would be no plot, no comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or 
catastrophe in the accepted style.” Instead, one might “record the atoms [or impressions] 
as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall” (Woolf 2008 [1937]: 9). Thus 
Woolf rejects the organic, implicitly patriarchal totalities of plot, calling for a new, atomic 
mode of representation.16 The latter entailed a reinvention of prose. “If you free it from 
the beast-of-burden work which so many novelists necessarily lay upon it, of carrying loads 
of details, bushels of fact—prose thus treated will show itself capable of rising high from 
the ground, not in one dart, but in sweeps and circles, and of keeping at the same time in 
touch with the amusements and idiosyncrasies of human character in daily life” (ibid.: 83). 
In a remarkable move, Woolf simultaneously rejects the “materialist” bias of realist prose, 
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releases it from the yoke of the Protestant work ethic, and sets out an original technical 
innovation combining prose with lyric and drama. This stylistic innovation is implicitly 
connected to an ideological critique of alienated labor, yet all the while this critique is 
internally limited by its location within the specific class fraction of Bloomsbury (cf. 
Williams 2010 [1980]: 148–69). 
We are now in a position to formulate a hypothesis as to the central contradiction 
of Woolf’s style in To the Lighthouse (though to test its validity and its pertinence to the rest 
of her oeuvre would require a far more detailed analysis). Narratologically Woolf’s style is 
characterized by two opposing forces: a centrifugal force that fragments the diegesis into 
multiple focalizers and a centripetal force of lyrical unification toward which the prose 
gravitates. While Woolf’s style entails a definite rejection of the rigid formalities associated 
with a patriarchal ruling class, her urge to weaponize her fragmented experience as a 
woman and to break open stylistic conventions to allow in the rain of the atoms of “life” 
is always checked by the necessity of poetic and rhythmic control. Her novels, despite 
rejecting the conventional narrative wholes of the “materialists,” are nonetheless informed 
by a lyrical and “poietical” logic and a system of symbolic unification (in To the Lighthouse, 
the recurring figure of the lighthouse itself). Yet this logic, which literally in-forms 
impersonal life—that life which the second section of To the Lighthouse attempts to capture 
in all its anonymous glory—can only ever be felt by Woolf as artistic death. For if 
“everything is the proper stuff of fiction” (Woolf 2008 [1937]: 12) and everything is a 
synonym of life, then to set limits to fictional representation is logically to court death. At 
the same time, to fail to find a sufficient form is to succumb to the refrain of Mr. Tansley 
that haunts Lily Briscoe: “Women can’t paint, women can’t write” (Woolf 2000 [1927]: 54). 
A woman’s success at challenging patriarchy is thus her potential artistic failure to allow 
life to live: that pressure is both artistic and existential. In a final dialectical twist, however, 
it seems that death itself is internal to Woolfian life. To the Lighthouse is replete with elegiac 
longings for “an earth entirely at rest” (ibid.: 25), where the only traces of human habitation 
are the remnants of a now-dead everyday existence: “What people had left—a pair of shoes, 
a shooting cap, some faded skirts and coats in wardrobes—those alone kept the human 
shape and in the emptiness indicated how once they were filled and animated” (ibid.: 141). 
This elegiac tone and content is in many ways a compromise formation. It opens up the 
novel to impersonal life by mourning the personae of realism. Although Lily ultimately 
completes her painting, it is not before she realizes that “it would be hung in the attics . . . 
it would be destroyed” (ibid.: 225). The paradoxes of Woolf’s style dictate that art is not 
open to life without first being open to death. 
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Conclusion 
If style in the novel has often been associated with the struggle for democracy, Woolf’s 
stylistic innovations renew and deepen that struggle at a critical historical juncture. A strictly 
narratological theory of style is unable to articulate the social and political dimensions of 
such innovations. If combined with a critical poetics, however, narratology could become 
integral to a sophisticated social formalism. As we have seen, this involves the critical 
reconstruction of the historical and literary situation to which the work responds, seeking 
that elusive point at which the “inner” necessity of the work coincides with the “external” 
necessity of the situation. In cases like that of Woolf, however, where the writer pursues 
her artistic vision to its extreme limits, social formalism encounters limits of its own. A 
critical poetics remains critical only to the extent that it can stay true to the intensity of the 
vision it seeks to explain. Where that vision broaches the absolute, the task of the critic 
becomes less that of explaining the logic of a singularity than that of thinking the truth of 
an event.17 
I conclude by briefly noting what distinguishes a critical poetics from narratological 
approaches to style. First, by combining an attention to verbal texture, tone, and rhythm 
with an emphasis on structural narrative organization, the present theory of style 
overcomes the problematic divide Dan Shen (2005) identifies between the (nonverbal) 
“discourse” of narratology and the (verbal) “style” of stylistics. Second, the emphasis on 
dialectical totalization of distinct stylistic levels, an aspect that is largely absent from Walsh’s 
tripartite theory of voice, echoes Richard Aczel’s (1998: 483) Bakhtin-inspired 
understanding of voice as a “composite entity; a specific configuration of voices.” Where Aczel 
locates the ultimate unity of this configuration in “a set of identifiable rhetorical principles” 
(ibid.), however, I hypothesize that the source of unity of a literary work is the dynamic 
operation of “poietic” mimesis itself. This operation is informed by techniques of literary 
composition, which are themselves crystallizations of forms of practical consciousness, 
implemented by a writer who is their host and practitioner. Third and by extension, I 
acknowledge and account for the singularity of an author’s style but disarticulate it from 
any individual or authorial essence of which it would be the “expression.”18 This is a strictly 
transindividual theory of style. Individual styles are singular conjunctions of transindividual 
social, political, and literary processes carried out under the experiential pressures of 
specific historical conjunctures. Finally, by attempting to identify the informing logic of the 
operation of literary composition, critical poetics is primarily a theory of literary production. 
Literary works and their paratextual apparatuses are the material “traces” of this operation 
(cf. Dawson 2013: 482–84). Like the “trace” itself, however, style can never be reduced to 
the retrospective projection of an originating instance. Its materiality enables new 
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encounters in the present—an opening to further singular conjunctions and myriad 
unforeseeable futures. 
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I am grateful to Paul Dawson and the anonymous peer reviewer for their critical feedback 
on a previous version of this article. All remaining errors are my own. 
1. Social formalism is a term Raymond Williams (1983 [1976]: 139) ascribed to the work of 
Jan Mukařovský and Valentin Voloshinov. Paul Jones (2004: 92–126) has extended it to 
the work of Williams himself. I use it here as an umbrella term for those often Marxist-
inspired theories of literary and cultural forms which emphasize their inherent sociality and 
intrinsic (albeit highly variable) relation to ideology. 
2. These are direct authorial literary-artistic narration, stylization of the various forms of 
oral everyday narration, stylization of the various forms of semiliterary (written) everyday 
narration, various forms of literary but extra-artistic authorial speech, and stylistically 
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individualized speech of characters (Bakhtin 1981: 262). Strictly speaking, of course, 
Williams refers to discourse types, whereas Bakhtin deals with modes of voice. 
3. Henry James famously wrote that “the good little Thomas Hardy has scored a great 
success with Tess of the d’Urbervilles, which is chock-full of faults and falsity, and yet has a 
singular charm” (cited in Leavis 1962 [1948]: 33). F. R. Leavis concurred. 
4. Walsh’s critique of the category of the narrator should not be read as a simplistic return 
to the biographical author. Walsh (2007: 130–47) understands the novelist as a “medium.” 
In what follows I understand the author to be the individualized result of what Michel 
Foucault (1998 [1969]: 108) has called the “author function.” 
5. Arguably even James Phelan’s (2005: 18) notion of a “doubled communicative situation” 
(“the narrator tells her story to her narratee for her purposes, while the author 
communicates to her audience for her own purposes both that story and the narrator’s 
telling of it”) suffers from this problem, since it is not used as a criterion to distinguish 
fiction from nonfiction. “The doubled communicative situation of fictional narration and 
even much non-fictional narration . . . is itself a layered ethical situation” (ibid.: 20; first emphasis 
added). 
6. Bakhtin (1984: 189) distinguishes between direct and objectified discourse: 
“Unmediated, direct, fully signifying discourse is directed toward its referential object and 
constitutes the ultimate semantic authority within the limits of a given context. Objectified 
discourse is likewise directed exclusively toward its object, but is at the same time the object 
of someone else’s intention, the author’s.” 
7. In the following definition I replace the term voice with style. I hold that much of the 
confusion generated by the concept of “voice” when referring to written texts—precisely 
the confusion it was Walsh’s task to dispel—could be limited by referring instead to “style.” 
Style invites a primarily scriptural problematic which the dubious vocal metaphor—with its 
Derridean specters—does not. I accept John Frow’s (2014: 149–80) and Peter Boxall’s 
(2015: 19–38) arguments that “voice” can never be entirely eradicated from the experience 
of reading novelistic prose, but I hold that a focus on style would limit potential 
philosophical confusion. 
8. Stephen Halliwell (1998) explains that such handbooks were systematically developed 
for didactic purposes by the Sophists in the fifth century BCE. He notes that proof of their 
existence and types can be found in Aristophanes’s Frogs. He distinguishes Aristotle’s Poetics 
from such didactic handbooks by the coherence of its overarching philosophical argument 
and “the abstract character of the principles and injunctions which the didactic phrasing is 
used to introduce” (ibid.: 38). 
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9. These are selected from a more expansive critical repertoire developed in Hartley 2017. 
10. Free indirect discourse combines internal focalization with voice as idiom (objectified 
discourse), the author speaking in the voice of another, whereas diegesis with internal 
focalization presupposes no such idiomatic imitation, the author continues to speak in her 
or his own voice under the regime of fictionality. Free indirect discourse is a form of 
discursive mimesis, whereas focalization pertains to narrative diegesis (Walsh 2010: 51). 
11. Lanser (1992: 119) reads this in terms of fictional authority: “Woolf collectivizes 
authoriality without ceding it, giving a different shape to authorial imperatives rather than 
refusing them. . . such female authority is still marked by the privileges of race and class.” 
12. Catherine Gallagher (2006) argues convincingly that fictionality arose with the novel in 
the eighteenth century. There are then two possible ways of conceptualizing what I have 
called “historical regimes of fictionality.” The first, inspired by certain positions Boxall 
(2015) puts forward, might conceive of such regimes as so many returns to the foundational 
paradoxes of the discourse of fictionality itself (cf. Gallagher 2006: 340), with each 
historical regime pursuing its own practical and theoretical solutions to the same 
fundamental paradoxes. Alternatively, drawing on Jacques Rancière’s (2007: 15) distinction 
of “regimes of identification of art,” which are “system[s] of relations between practices, 
the forms of visibility of these practices, and modes of intelligibility,” regimes of fictionality 
could be conceived as reconfigurations of such relations internal to what Rancière calls the 
“aesthetic regime,” which includes both realism and modernism. 
13. For reasons of space I have limited myself to Ricoeur’s “mimesis1” and “mimesis2.” 
For concepts pertaining to “mimesis3,” see Hartley 2017: 239–57. 
14. I expand on each of these subsituations in Hartley 2017: 209–19. 
15. Williams (1977: 106–7) developed the concept of structure of feeling partly through his 
rejection of orthodox Marxist “base-superstructure” theories of culture, which depended 
on “a known history, a known structure, known products,” that is, on internally complete 
systems of thought with an assumed fully achieved articulation. Such theories do not allow 
for the often frustrating and painful lived experiences of the present whose affective 
valences defy immediate articulation. 
16. On precisely this point, see Rancière 2014: 56–69. It is no coincidence that the subtext 
of Woolf’s Waves is Lucretius’s De rerum natura. 
17. Alain Badiou develops this idea in Petit manuel d’inesthétique (1998). Jean-Jacques Lecercle 
(2010) provides a powerful example of how social formalism might be productively 
combined with Badiou’s philosophical approach. 
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18. To that extent, my theory of style belongs to the post-deconstructionist lineage Paul 
Dawson (2013) identifies. 
 
